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I. INTRODUCTION
Initial interest confusion and contributory liability are both wellestablished doctrines of trademark law. However, with the growing use
and influence of the Internet, courts have struggled to apply laws written
for ordinary “brick-and-mortar” store commerce to commerce in
cyberspace. Imagine the “Average Joe,” sitting at his computer, ready to
search the Internet for a specific product. Joe brings up a popular Internet
search engine and types in the brand name of the product for which he is
searching. After initiating the search, Joe scrolls though the results to
find his product. Now imagine that after he has initiated his search,
several advertisements and pop-up ads appear on his screen. Joe is
confused as to which one of these advertisements is the one he wants to
use. But is this “Average Joe” actually confused as to the source of the
goods advertised by the sellers? Would he be confused as to why the ads
are appearing or who is sponsoring the ads? Or is this “Average Joe”
merely diverted and not actually confused? These questions result in a
split among the circuit courts of appeals that creates significant problems
for trademark holders. Courts disagree as to whether this “Average Joe”
has actually been the victim of initial interest confusion and whether the
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Internet search engine should be liable for contributory trademark
infringement.1
The Supreme Court has yet to address these issues. This comment
suggests that one can find guidance in these difficult areas of trademark
law by examining how courts have considered the goals of copyright and
trademark law when making decisions. Copyrights and trademarks are
two distinct areas of the law meant to protect intellectual property under
different theories of infringement. Yet copyright and trademark laws
share one significant goal in common: finding a balance among the
interests of consumers, competitors and intellectual property holders.
While trademark and copyright laws protect consumers, competitors, and
intellectual property holders, often these parties have competing
interests. As a result, courts have recognized the importance of striking a
balance among these parties.2 Courts can use this similarity to fill in the
gaps in trademark law and answer the difficult questions presented by
initial interest confusion and contributory liability in the Internet context.
This comment discusses the difficulties courts have faced when
dealing with initial interest confusion in the Internet context. The Second
Circuit has concluded that trademark uses hidden from the Internet user
in coding are not violations of trademark laws.3 The Ninth Circuit has not
specifically inquired into this issue, but nonetheless has created opposing
precedent.4 This situation has resulted in different outcomes in the
district courts over identical factual situations.5
The purpose of this comment is to resolve the conflict and
introduce a new, stricter standard for initial interest confusion and
contributory liability. The new standard reflects how courts have
balanced the interests of consumers, competitors, and intellectual
property holders in three important cases involving contributory
copyright liability in the Internet context.6 The Sony, Napster, and MGM
Studios cases developed a standard for contributory copyright liability by
1

See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005);
Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
2
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
3
1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 400.
4
Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d at 1020.
5
Compare Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32970 (D.
Ariz. May 3, 2007); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32450 (D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc.,
330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“GEICO I”), with Rescuecom Corp. v. Google,
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (D.N.Y. 2006).
6
See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S 417 (1984); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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balancing the effects of judicial opinions on the various parties involved.7
These cases present a strong argument for the way courts should apply
intellectual property liability in the trademark context.
The proposed standard for initial interest confusion in the Internet
context is the “ordinary prudent Internet consumer.” This standard would
only find consumers “confused” if a consumer’s search for a specific
trademark resulted in advertisements which actually displayed an
infringing trademark to the consumer or user. This standard would work
to benefit the parties affected and balance the interests of consumers,
competitors, and intellectual property holders.
The change to the standard for initial interest confusion in the
Internet context would certainly have an effect on the application of
contributory trademark liability. The Supreme Court has established two
tests for contributory trademark liability: (1) a knowledge test and (2) an
inducement test.8 The new “ordinary prudent Internet consumer”
standard would affect the application of both tests. However, the effects
would still work to balance the interests of intellectual property holders,
consumers, and Internet search engines.
This comment examines the circuit split created by the “Average
Joe” scenario and presents a more streamlined standard for initial interest
confusion and contributory liability in the Internet context based on the
common copyright and trademark goal of balancing interests. Part II
presents an overview of trademark law. This section describes the goals
of trademark law as well as the development of initial interest confusion
from ordinary store commerce into the Internet context. This section also
introduces contributory liability in trademark cases. Part III examines the
circumstances of the circuit split and provides examples of the effects on
district courts. Part IV presents an overview of copyright law. This
section discusses the goal of copyright law. It also examines how courts
have used this goal to develop a test for contributory copyright liability.
Part V discusses the common balancing goal of trademark and copyright
law and proposes a standard for initial interest confusion in light of this
goal. Finally, the comment considers the effects of this new standard for
initial interest confusion in the Internet context on the application of
contributory trademark liability.
II. TRADEMARKS
Part II of this comment presents a brief overview of trademark laws
involving initial interest confusion and contributory liability. This section
7
8

See cases cited, supra note 6.
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs. Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982).
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first examines the major goal of trademark law—that of balancing the
interests of consumers, competitors, and intellectual property holders.
Next, the section introduces the Lanham Act and initial interest
confusion. The comment also discusses the transition of initial interest
confusion from ordinary store commerce into the Internet context.
Finally, this section will introduce the doctrine of contributory trademark
liability.
A. Goals of Trademark Law
Trademark laws benefit consumers, competitors and intellectual
property holders.9 However, the interests of these groups do not always
coincide.10 As a result, one of the major goals of trademark law is to
balance these interests to make decisions that maximize the benefits to
all.11
Trademark law recognizes that consumers need protection from
deception and confusion created by confusingly similar marks.12 Such
protection allows consumers to make informed choices about the
products which consumers are buying.13 A trademark “quickly and easily
assures” the consumer that the particular trademark item “is made by the
same producer as other similarly-marked items that he or she liked (or
disliked) in the past.”14 Accordingly, courts are concerned with
protecting consumers from deceit while allowing consumers to easily
recognize specific products.
Consumers and competitors also benefit from restrictions on the
exclusivity of the trademark holder’s rights. The law allows competitors
to use other trademarks in ways which create only minimal confusion.15
By permitting competing companies to use trademarks in ways that
encourage free competition, consumers may benefit from a variety of
choice and fair prices in the market.16 Competitors are free to “[use]
9

See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 1:1, 1:2 (4th ed. 2006).
10
Id.
11
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1:2.
12
Oscar C. Cisneros, Berkeley Technology Law Journal Annual Review of Law and
Technology: I. Intellectual Property: C. Trademark: 1. Defenses: a) Fair Use: Bally
Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 230 (2000).
13
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
14
Id.
15
See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b)(4), 1125(c)(4) (2006).
16
See Stephanie M. Greene, Sorting out “Fair Use” and “Likelihood of Confusion”
in Trademark Law, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 43, 43–45, (2006); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“It is
the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services.”); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1:1 (“[T]he pressures of competitive rivalry tend to keep
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another’s mark, not as an indicator of the source of the product, which
would mislead, but only to describe the person’s product, which would
inform.”17 In fact, “[b]oth the [Federal Trade Commission] and the [Food
and Drug Administration] encourage product comparisons. The FTC
believes that consumers gain from comparative advertising, and to make
the comparison vivid, the Commission ‘encourages the naming of, or
reference to competitors.’”18 Such uses enhance competition by
increasing consumer education about alternative products.19 Allowing
free “[c]ompetition normally drives down prices and leads to greater
consumer satisfaction.”20 As a result, courts have needed to balance
trademark protection in light of public policy favoring free competition.21
While the interests of consumers and competitors are important,
these must also balance with the interests of intellectual property holders.
Trademark law grants the intellectual property holder the exclusive right
to use his trademark to indicate the source of his goods.22 Companies
today make great investments to establish goodwill and the quality of
their products.23 Courts recognized this great investment of time and
capital and have accordingly protected the trademark holder from the
unjust enrichment of infringers.24 The law rewards producers of desirable
products by protecting the trademark holder’s goodwill while
discouraging “those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on
a consumer’s inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered
for sale.”25 Therefore, courts must consider the trademark holder’s strong
interest in protecting the investments made in goodwill and superior
products.
Consumers, competitors and trademark holders are able to benefit
from strong trademark laws. Consumers benefit from access to
trademarks that provide clarity as to the source of goods. Consumers and
prices down at the lowest level at which a seller can enjoy a reasonable profit and still
remain viable.”).
17
David W. Barnes and Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use of Trademarks: Confusion
About Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 833, 840 (2004).
18
August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting 16
C.F.R. § 14.15(b)).
19
Barnes, supra note 17, at 840.
20
Id. at 849. See also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1:1.
21
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968).
22
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
23
Jonathan L. Schwartz, Making the Consumer Watchdog’s Bark as Strong as Its
Gripe: Complaint Sites and the Changing Dynamic of the Fair Use Defense, 16 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 59, 86 (2006).
24
E.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.14 (1982); Nitro
Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 2:30.
25
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
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competitors benefit from access to trademarks, which results in free
competition and fair prices. Trademark holders benefit from the law’s
protection of the investments in goodwill and restrictions on the
competition. In order to provide the maximum benefit to all parties,
courts must balance the interests of consumers, competitors, and
trademark holders.
B. Initial Interest Confusion
Courts have recognized initial interest confusion as a cause of
action for trademark holders under the Lanham Act.26 Trademarks are
defined in the Lanham Act as “any word, name, symbol, or device . . .
[used] in commerce . . . to identify and distinguish . . . [a product] from
those manufactured or sold by others.”27 The Lanham Act prohibits the
use of “any reproduction . . . of a registered mark” where “such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”28 The
Lanham Act further protects against “confusion resulting when a
consumer seeks a particular trademark holder’s product and instead is
lured to those of a competitor by its use of the same or a similar mark.”29
The result is actual consumer confusion. In certain situations, some fact
or occurrence dispels the consumer’s confusion before any purchase is
made. Courts refer to this “brand” of confusion as initial interest
confusion.30
The Lanham Act also permits competitors to make certain fair uses
of trademarks.31 According to the Federal Circuit, “the Lanham does not
prevent the truthful use of trademarks, even if such use results in the
enrichment of others.”32 Three types of fair uses are classic, comparative
and nominative. Classic fair use allows a competitor to use another’s
trademark to describe the competitor’s own products. For example, “the
registered owner of the mark SUPERSWEET, used in connection with . .
. DVDs, might complain if Hershey’s used the words ‘supersweet’ to
26

See Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2006); Checkpoint
Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001); Elvis Presley
Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d
376 (7th Cir. 1996); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.
1987).
27
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
28
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
29
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Initial Interest Confusion Under the Lanham
Trademark Act, 183 A.L.R. Fed. 553 (2006).
30
See cases cited, supra note 26.
31
Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
32
Id.
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describe one of its candy bars.”33 The Lanham Act protects Hershey’s
from infringement because Hershey’s was “using the term [not] as a
source-indicating mark but only to describe its goods, which it is entitled
to do.”34 Comparative uses allow competitors to use other trademarks to
name or describe the trademark holder’s own products.35 For example,
“[a] competing perfume manufacturer might use the ‘Chanel No. 5’ mark
to describe the scent of its own perfume.”36 Nominative fair uses allow
competitors to use other trademarks to describe their own goods and
services.37 A garage, unrelated to a car manufacturer, may have a sign
which reads “Volkswagen Repair Shop” to describe its services.38 The
Supreme Court has held that “fair use can occur along with some degree
of confusion.”39 In other words, consumer confusion does not necessarily
negate fair use. However, the Court also indicated that allowing fair uses
with some degree of confusion does not “foreclose the relevance of the
extent of any likely consumer confusion in assessing whether a
defendant’s use is objectively fair.”40 The law protects competitors who
use other’s trademarks “fairly,” even if there is some risk of confusion.
Initial interest confusion, while different from actual confusion, can
still cause significant damage to trademark holders as well as to
consumers. Generally, confusion results when a competitor uses the
same or similar mark as the trademark holder to lure the consumer away
from the product of the trademark holder toward the competitor’s
product.41 Courts have noted that even if the consumer is aware of the
fact that the competitor’s product is not what the consumer initially
sought, this may not eliminate or negate the fact that the competitor has
infringed.42 Accordingly, courts have acknowledged the initial interest
confusion doctrine under the Lanham Act.43 Under the doctrine of initial
interest confusion, the consumer will later realize that the competitor’s
product was not the original product sought.44 However, the consumer
33

CRAIG ALLEN NARD, DAVID W. BARNES & MICHAEL J. MADISON, THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 263 (2006).
34
Id.
35
See Barnes, supra note 17, at 867.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123
(2004).
40
See id.
41
BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc. 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
42
Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999);
Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990).
43
See, e.g., Interstellar, 184 F.3d at 1110; Forum, 903 F.2d at 442 n.2.
44
See cases cited, supra note 42.
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may subsequently choose to purchase the product anyway or stay with
the competitor.45 The competitor has thus diverted potential customers
from the true trademark holder by infringing the trademark.46 The
Seventh Circuit has referred to this method of tricking consumers into
choosing or settling for a different product as “bait and switch.”47 Initial
interest confusion focuses entirely on confusion before the sale, and may
be present even if the consumer made no actual purchase.48 Although
initial interest confusion is different from actual confusion, the law
recognizes the damage that such deceitful tactics may cause to trademark
holders and consumers.
1. Brick-and-Mortar Store Commerce
The doctrine of initial interest confusion originated in the context of
ordinary transactions, often called “brick-and-mortar store commerce.”49
In Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons,
a piano manufacturer who happened to be the former partner of the
manufacturer of the famous Steinway pianos was selling pianos under
the name Grotrian-Steinway.50 The Second Circuit held that the
defendant used the hyphenated name to attract potential customers who
would associate the name Grotrian-Steinway with the reputation of the
pianos produced by Steinway.51 The court held that the plaintiff need not
demonstrate that there was actual confusion at the time of the purchase to
establish infringement.52 The Second Circuit found that a likelihood of
initial confusion, which would be damaging to the goodwill of the true
Steinway manufacturer, was in fact a violation of the Lanham Act.53
Soon after Grotrian, courts began to apply the initial interest
confusion doctrine to other situations, but the principles expressed in
Grotrian remained unchanged. In Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Capece,
45

See cases cited, supra note 42.
Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006).
47
Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc. 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996).
48
Interstellar, 184 F.3d at 1110; see also Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point
Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Confining actionable
confusion under the Lanham Act to confusion present at the time of purchase would
undervalue the importance of a company’s goodwill with its customers,” and, “the initial
interest confusion does not ultimately result in a purchasing decision, this factor counsels
against finding the likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.”).
49
BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (discussing Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons,
523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975)).
50
Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1334.
51
Id. at 1334.
52
Id. at 1342.
53
Id. at 1334.
46
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testifying witnesses stated that a bar’s apparent association with Elvis
Presley Enterprises (“EPE”) and the appearance that the bar might be
selling Elvis Merchandise, drew the witnesses into the bar.54 Once inside,
the appearance of the bar dispelled the consumers’ confusion; there was
clearly no association with EPE.55 The Fifth Circuit explained that the
confusion “ha[d] succeeded because some patrons might stay, despite
realizing that the bar has no relationship with EPE.”56 The court
reiterated the findings of the Second Circuit in Grotrian, that the
confusion created by the competitor’s use of the trademark can give the
competitor’s product credibility “during the early stages of a transaction
and can possibly bar the [trademark holder] from consideration by the
consumer once the confusion is dissipated.”57 As the Second Circuit
explained in Grotrian, the Fifth Circuit held that the use of the trademark
to create confusion was damaging to the trademark holder even if the
confusion ended before a purchase, and was therefore a violation of the
Lanham Act.58
2. Bringing a Cause of Action for Initial Interest Confusion
For all trademark infringement claims, the law limits the
application of the initial interest confusion doctrine. First, the plaintiff
must be able to show a valid trademark that is entitled to protection
under the Lanham Act.59 Second, the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant used the trademark in commerce.60 Finally, the plaintiff must
be able to prove that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark
created a likelihood of confusion.61 The plaintiff must establish all three
of these elements to bring a successful cause of action for initial interest
confusion.62
Plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of the Lanham Act to
establish a valid trademark.63 A certificate of registration is prima facie
54

Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id.
56
Id. The Fifth Circuit also noted that here, “initial-interest confusion is even more
significant because the Defendants’ bar sometimes charges a cover charge for entry,
which allows the Defendants to benefit from initial-interest confusion before it can be
dissipated by entry into the bar.” Id.
57
Id.; Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1342.
58
Elvis, 141 F.3d at 204.
59
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 279 (3d
Cir. 2001).
60
See id.
61
Id. However, the defendant may claim the affirmative defense that this particular
use was in fact a “fair use” under the Lanham Act.
62
See Checkpoint, 269 F.3d at 279.
63
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
55
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evidence of a valid trademark.64 Without a valid registration, the plaintiff
must satisfy three requirements to establish a valid trademark.65 First, the
trademark must be “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof,” which is quite a non-restrictive requirement.66
Second, the holder must use the trademark in commerce.67 Courts have
also interpreted this to mean that the trademark holder must be the senior
user.68 The “senior user” is the first to use the mark, with the right to stop
the junior user from using “confusingly similar marks in the same
industry and market or within the senior user’s natural zone of
expansion.”69 Finally, the trademark must identify and distinguish the
source of the goods, a requirement that is the most restrictive of the
three.70 If the plaintiff has a registered trademark or can successfully
establish the elements of a valid trademark under the Lanham Act, the
plaintiff must still show use in commerce as well as a likelihood of
confusion.
A plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant used the
trademark “‘in connection with’ sale of goods and services.”71 In The
Trademarks Cases, the Supreme Court held that any power to regulate
trademarks must fall under Congress’ power to regulate commerce.72
This placed the burden on the plaintiff to show use in commerce in order
to warrant application of the Lanham Act: “federal jurisdiction over
trademarks generally extends only” to uses in commerce.73 Therefore,
non-commercial uses of trademarks did not trigger claims under the
Lanham Act.74
Finally, a plaintiff must establish a likelihood of confusion. Courts
use an “ordinarily prudent consumer” standard when determining
whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion.75 This standard, though
similar in theory to its counterpart in tort litigation (the “reasonably

64

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006).
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166.
66
15 U.S.C. § 1127; Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
67
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166.
68
E.g., Lucent Info. Mgmt. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 1999);
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
69
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047 (9th Cir. 1999).
70
See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166.
71
Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kramer, 403 F.3d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, No.
02-633, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 920 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003).
72
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 6:2.
73
Id.
74
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 94–95.
75
Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 827, 830 (2004).
65
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prudent person”), is quite different in trademark litigation.76 While the
tort standard represents more of a hypothetical, idealized person,77 the
trademark incarnation is more of a proxy for the reactions of real
consumers.78 Yet at least one author has described the “ordinarily
prudent consumer” as “very often less than prudent, exhibiting instead
unthinking and irrational responses to branding messages.”79
Courts use a variety of factors to determine whether or not the
“ordinarily prudent consumer” would be confused.80 Each circuit utilizes
its own set of factors to determine likelihood of confusion.81 Many of the
factors are consistent among the circuits while some factors are unique to
certain circuits.82 Compare, for example, the eight-factor Sleekcraft test
used by the Ninth Circuit:
(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3)
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5)
marketing channels used; (6) types of goods and the degree of
care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s
intent in selecting the mark; [and] (8) likelihood of expansion of
the product lines83

with the eight-factor Polaroid test used by the Second Circuit:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of
similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) the
proximity of the products or services; (4) the likelihood that
plaintiff will bridge the gap between its products or services and
those marketed by the defendant; (5) evidence of actual
confusion; (6) defendant’s good faith in adopting the mark; (7)
the quality of defendant’s products or services; and (8) the
sophistication of the buyers. 84

76

Id. at 834.
PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32 (W. Page Keaton et al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984).
78
Austin, supra note 75, at 834.
79
Id. at 832.
80
Id.
81
See, e.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006);
Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1987); see also 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 9, at § 23:19 n.2 (“Each circuit has created its own list of factors and the
litigator is well-advised not to rely upon a list from a ‘foreign’ circuit.”).
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3 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 23:19. For a comparison of confusion factors
from every circuit, see NARD, supra note 33, at 166.
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Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404–05 (9
Cir. 1997) (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).
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F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
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While the lists from the Ninth and the Second Circuits differ, they
are non-exclusive; courts may take into consideration all relevant
factors.85 Circuit courts apply similar factors to cases involving goods
and services competing in the same or overlapping markets (competitive)
and goods and services in different markets (non-competitive).86 Each
factor’s weight is a fact-specific inquiry determined on a case-by-case
basis.87 Accordingly, courts may not require a majority of the factors to
weigh in one direction or another to determine a likelihood of
confusion.88
McCarthy suggests that plaintiffs may use at least three types of
evidence to prove a likelihood of confusion: surveys, evidence of actual
confusion, or “argument[s] based on a clear inference arising from a
comparison of the conflicting marks and the context of their use.”89
Evidence suggests that at least half of the time, plaintiffs and defendants
use surveys to establish whether or not there was a likelihood of
confusion.90 However, courts are free to decide whether surveys should
receive more or less weight.91 According to one scholar, the majority of
cases are decided not on survey evidence but on “judicial speculations
and assumptions about what consumers believe.”92 However, at least in
theory, each circuit considers its list of factors to determine whether the
“ordinary prudent consumer” is confused under the facts of each case.
However, the actual factors vary from circuit to circuit and the number of
factors which the plaintiff must establish in his favor remains
unspecified.
The Lanham Act protects the holders of valid trademark holders
from initial interest confusion. This protection exists even if the
competitor’s situation later dispels the confusion, because courts have
found that even without a purchase, the competitor’s actions may have
caused significant damage to the trademark holder. To maintain a
successful claim of initial interest confusion, a plaintiff must establish a
85

Elvis, 141 F.3d at 194 (citations omitted).
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 23:19. Non-competitive goods and services exist
in distinct markets whereas competitive goods and services exist in overlapping markets.
See AMF, Inc., 599 F.2d at 348.
87
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 280 (3d
Cir. 2001).
88
Austin, supra note 75, at 832.
89
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 23:2.50.
90
Austin, supra note 75, at 834.
91
Id.
92
Id. See also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving
Fame and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REV. 201, 237
n.270 (1999) (discussing how the level of survey evidence required for confusion varies
dramatically from court to court).
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valid trademark used in commerce by the defendant which caused initial
consumer confusion. Finally, plaintiffs must establish confusion by
satisfying an unspecified number of factors, which may differ from
circuit to circuit.
C. Trademarks and Contributory Liability
Under the doctrine of contributory liability, liability for trademark
infringement can extend to parties other than the direct infringer.93
Although the Lanham Act makes no mention of contributory liability, the
Supreme Court confirmed this theory of liability in Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.94 In that case, the Court explained that
liability for infringement in trademark cases could “extend beyond those
who actually mislabel goods with the mark of another.”95 According to
the Supreme Court, participants in the “chain of distribution” may be
liable for the infringing activities of others.96
In certain situations, contributory liability makes it easier for the
copyright or trademark holder to obtain relief after infringement.97
Contributory liability can implicate a deep pocket defendant or simply
reduce the amount of litigation necessary to protect the holder of the
intellectual property. Framed differently, contributory liability saves
money.98 Finding contributory liability in some cases, especially those
involving the Internet, makes it easier to curtail widespread
infringement.99 If courts are unwilling to protect the trademark holders
by not allowing contributory liability in certain cases, “the value of
trademarks to the consumer [and the trademark holder] is reduced.”100
In Inwood, the Supreme Court introduced two legal tests for
contributory trademark liability: a knowledge test and an inducement
test.101 Both tests require an underlying infringement and a material
contribution to that infringement. 102 Under the knowledge test, a party
which “continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement . . . is
93

4 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 25:17.
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
95
Id. at 853.
96
Id. at 853–54.
97
Brian D. Kaiser, Note, Contributory Trademark Infringement by Internet Service
Providers: An Argument for Limitation, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 4 (2002).
98
Id.
99
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
100
Kaiser, supra note 97, at 4.
101
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S 417, 439 (1984).
102
See cases cited, supra note 101.
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contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the
deceit.”103 Many courts have interpreted this to mean that “the ordinary
business person cannot claim innocence if the facts are such that any
reasonable person in such a position should have known that it was
actively participating in an operation which constituted . . . trademark
infringement.”104 Under the inducement rule, if one party intentionally
“induces another to infringe a trademark . . .” that party may be
“contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.”
Therefore, under the two tests set forth in Inwood Labs, contributory
liability for trademark infringement requires an underlying direct
infringement, a material contribution to that infringement, and either
knowledge of that underlying infringement or intent to induce that
infringement.105
Parties that contribute to trademark infringement may be liable
under the theory of contributory liability. Contributory liability is an
important doctrine because it enables trademark holders to curtail
widespread infringement and reduces the amount of litigation and money
necessary to protect the interests of both trademark holders and
consumers. Though the Lanham Act does not explicitly mention of
contributory liability, the Supreme Court recognized this doctrine in
Inwood, creating the knowledge test and the inducement test.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Part III of this comment introduces three key cases that deal with
initial interest confusion and contributory liability in the Internet context.
This section discusses the fundamental split between the Second and
Ninth Circuits regarding an approach to new uses of trademarks in
keywords and metatags. This section also reviews how district courts
responded to this division.
A. Introduction
There is a clear divide between the circuit courts of appeals
concerning the application of the initial interest confusion doctrine.
Congress passed the Lanham Act long before any computer use was
widespread. As a result, courts increasingly struggle to apply current
trademark laws meant for ordinary commercial transactions to a new
electronic medium—the Internet.106 Courts face new vocabulary, new
103

Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854.
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 25:19.
105
See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854.
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Chad J. Doellenger, Trademarks, Metatags, and Initial Interest Confusion: A Look
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types of competition, and new applications of old laws. As stated before,
initial interest confusion requires use in commerce of a valid trademark
which creates initial confusion. The circuits split on the way to treat
technological advances which prevent consumers from observing how
competitors are using other trademarks. The Second Circuit has held that
use of trademarks in metatags and keywords is not “use in commerce”
under the Lanham Act.107 The Ninth Circuit’s Internet cases dealing with
initial interest confusion suggest that such uses are, in fact, “use in
commerce.”108 This division leaves district courts struggling to justify
disparate decisions for cases that share similar facts.
B. The Second Circuit
In the 1-800 Contacts case, the Second Circuit focused on the “use”
issue and made no confusion inquiry after 1-800 Contacts sued WhenU
for infringing on 1-800 Contact’s trademarks in violation of the Lanham
Act.109 The defendant, WhenU, employed software to monitor computer
user activities to trigger pop-up ads on the computer user’s desktop when
the user accessed the 1-800 Contacts’ website.110 WhenU’s software
selected pop-up ads at random based on categorical associations with the
websites the computer user visited.111 For instance, the Second Circuit
provided the example that a visit to www.1-800Contacts.com might
trigger the category of ‘eye care.’112 WhenU’s software would then send
the computer user a pop-up advertisement from one of the sponsors listed
under “eye care.”113 The Second Circuit held that causing “separate,
branded pop-up ads to appear on a [computer] user’s computer screen
either above, below, or along the bottom edge of the 1-800 Contacts
website window” was not considered a “use” under the Lanham Act.114
The Second Circuit indicated five significant reasons why it did not
find use. First, the court explained that WhenU never actually displayed
the trademarks programmed into WhenU’s software to the computer
user.115 Second, the court found that the “mark” used by WhenU was

Doellenger, “a new medium is not sufficient justification to disregard the current body of
intellectual property jurisprudence.” Id. at 179.
107
1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005).
108
Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir.
2004).
109
1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 402.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 412.
112
Id. at 410.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 403.
115
Id. at 408.
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different than 1-800 Contacts’ trademark because WhenU transformed 1800 Contacts’ mark into “a word combination that functions more or less
like a public key to 1-800 Contacts’ website.”116 In other words, WhenU
was simply using 1-800 Contacts’ website designation as a location on
the Internet rather than a trademark.117 Third, the court held that there
was no sale,118 since WhenU did not sell keyword trademarks to
advertisers.119 Fourth, the pop-up ads did not display 1-800 Contacts’
trademarks.120 Finally, WhenU did “not link trademarks to any particular
competitor’s ads, and a customer cannot pay to have its pop-up ad appear
on any specific website or in connection with any particular
trademark.”121 For these five reasons, the Second Circuit never
considered issues beyond the “use in commerce” requirement.
C. The Ninth Circuit
In the Ninth Circuit’s first application of the initial interest
confusion doctrine in the Internet context, the court concluded that using
trademarks in metatags did in fact create initial confusion, and that such
confusion was “exactly what the trademark laws are designed to
prevent.”122 In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp., Brookfield created software that allowed users to
search for movie information.123 West Coast subsequently began
operating the site “moviebuff.com” with a searchable database of movie
information.124 The court explained that consumers searching the Internet
looking for Brookfield’s “Moviebuff” software would find both
Brookfield’s and West Coast’s websites listed on an Internet search
engine’s results page.125 Consumers who then chose West Coast’s listing
would find another movie database “similar enough to ‘Moviebuff’ such
that a sizable number of consumers who were originally looking for
Brookfield’s product will simply decide to utilize West Coast’s offerings
instead.”126 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case using the Sleekcraft
factors and explained that, “[a]lthough there is no source confusion in the
116

Id. at 408–09.
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Id. at 411–12.
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sense that consumers know they are patronizing West Coast rather than
Brookfield [because of the different Internet domain names], there is
nevertheless initial interest confusion.”127 The Ninth Circuit indicated
that West Coast’s use of the name “Moviebuff” on its website and
metatags was “like posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of
one’s store.” 128
Later, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corp., the Ninth Circuit found initial interest confusion, but never
specifically addressed the “use in commerce” inquiry.129 The Ninth
Circuit found “clear evidence” of Netscape’s “use in commerce” of
Playboy’s trademark with no significant inquiry.130 Both the majority and
concurring opinions assumed “use in commerce” and focused on the
likelihood of confusion analysis.131 The court reviewed the Sleekcraft
factors and concluded that the uncontradicted survey evidence was
strong enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to actual
confusion, enabling the court to reverse the lower court’s grant of
summary judgment for Netscape.132
In Playboy, Netscape used a practice known as “keying.”133 When
“keying,” advertisers are able to directly link their advertisements to
specific search terms entered by the consumer.134 According to the court,
Netscape used “various lists of terms to which they key advertisers’

127

Id.
Id. at 1064. The Ninth Circuit explained that:
Search engines look for keywords in places such as domain names, actual
text on the web page, and metatags. Metatags are HTML code intended to
describe the contents of the web site. There are different types of metatags,
but those of principal concern to us are the “description” and “keyword”
metatags. The description metatags are intended to describe the web site; the
keyword metatags, at least in theory, contain keywords relating to the
contents of the web site. The more often a term appears in the metatags and
in the text of the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will be
“hit” in a search for that keyword and the higher on the list of “hits” the web
page will appear.
Id. at 1045.
129
Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir.
2004).
130
Id. at 1032. The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of “use in commerce” was limited to its
inquiry into Playboy’s dilution claims. The court explained that use must fall into one of
three categories: commercial, political, or “some other more closely protected speech.”
Because the defendants did not argue that their speech was political, the court concluded
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banner ads.”135 Playboy sued Netscape over a list of terms relating to
“sex and adult-oriented entertainment,” including the words “playboy”
and “playmate,” which Playboy had trademarked.136 The court explained
that Netscape “require[s] adult-oriented companies to link their ads to
this set of words. Thus, when a user types in ‘playboy,’ ‘playmate,’ or
one of the other listed terms, those companies’ banner ads appear on the
search results page.”137 The categorical associations used by Netscape
were different than those used by WhenU. Despite this, the consumer
experience was the same in both 1-800 Contacts and Playboy;
advertisements for competitors appeared on the user’s screen when the
user entered the plaintiff’s trademark into an Internet search engine.
D. The Google Fallout
As a result of the Ninth Circuit’s failure to discuss “use in
commerce” in the Playboy decision along with the Second Circuit’s
holding in 1-800 Contacts, district courts have divided on the issue of
initial interest confusion and contributory liability in the Internet
context.138 Specifically, companies suing over Google’s AdWords
program obtain different ruling from almost identical factual
situations.139 The following discussion presents examples of the division
among district courts pertaining to Google’s AdWords program.
Relying on both the Playboy decision and the district court’s
decision in the 1-800 Contacts case, the District of Virginia has held that
Google’s use of trademarks in computer coding was, in fact, “use in
commerce.”140 The court rejected Google’s argument that Google used
the trademarks only in computer coding so the marks were not “used” in
135

Id. at 1023.
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the Lanham sense. 141 Under Google’s advertising scheme, when a user
typed in the name GEICO, a list of competitors appeared under
“sponsored links.”142 Google was essentially “allowing advertisers to bid
on the trademarks and pay defendants to be linked to the trademarks.”143
The district court found sufficient evidence to “survive defendant’s
[m]otion on the narrow issue of whether advertisements that appear when
a user searches on GEICO’s trademarks and do reference those marks in
their headings or text violate the Lanham Act.”144 The court emphasized
that the ruling applied “only to the specific facts of this case, which
include the unique business model employed by [GEICO] and the
specific design of defendant’s advertising program and search results
pages.”145
In Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., the District Court for the
District of Arizona stated that “while other courts have ruled that
keyword use of a trademark does not constitute ‘use’ in commerce under
the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed this
issue.”146 The court had previously enjoined the defendant from using the
plaintiff’s trademark in Google’s AdWords program.147 The court
refused to modify the injunction, rejecting the defendant’s argument that
“a defendant is not engaged in the requisite ‘use’ of a trademark or other
mark unless the defendant uses the mark to identify the source of its own
goods or services.”148 The court explained that, “unless the Ninth Circuit
expressly analyzes and holds that keyword use of a trademark does not
constitute ‘use in commerce,’ then, regardless of whether or not such use
is a ‘use in commerce’ under the Lanham Act, there has been no change
in the Ninth Circuit on this matter.”149
In Google Inc. v. American Blind and Wallpaper Factory, Inc., the
District Court for the Northern District of California held that “the sale of
trademarked terms in the AdWords program is a use in commerce for the
141

Id. at 704–05. In 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467
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purposes of the Lanham Act.”150 The court explained that “[w]hile the
Second Circuit’s decision in 1-800 Contacts and the subsequent district
court decisions may cause the Ninth Circuit to consider this issue
explicitly, the lengthy discussions of likelihood of confusion in
Brookfield and Playboy would have been unnecessary in the absence of
actionable trademark use.”151 The court concluded that “Playboy makes
an implicit finding of trademark use in commerce in the manner at issue
here.”152
The District Court for the Northern District of New York followed
the holding in 1-800 Contacts that Google’s use of trademarks in coding
for Google’s AdWords program was not, in fact, a “use in commerce.”153
The court found that the “[d]efendant’s internal use of plaintiff’s
trademark to trigger sponsored links is not a use of a trademark within
the meaning of the Lanham Act, either, because there is no allegation
that defendant places plaintiff’s trademark on any goods, containers,
displays, or advertisements, or that its internal use is visible to the
public.”154 Therefore the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims of
trademark infringement against Google.155
The division between the holdings of the Second and the Ninth
Circuits complicates various district courts in their treatment of identical
situations. The Second Circuit’s clear decision on “use in commerce”
and the Ninth Circuit’s avoidance of the issue result in opposing district
courts positions regarding identical factual situations. Thus, the
predictability of outcome for trademark cases which involve initial
interest confusion and contributory liability in the Internet context
remains extremely uncertain.
IV. COPYRIGHT
Part IV of this comment presents a brief overview of copyright law
in the area of contributory liability, both in the ordinary and Internet
commerce contexts. This section first discusses the goals of copyright
protection and the Copyright Act of 1976. Next, it introduces
contributory copyright infringement. Finally, the section reviews three
significant cases involving contributory infringement—one in the
ordinary commerce context and two in the Internet context, to then
150
Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32450, at *21 (D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).
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discuss how each of the three cases harnessed the goal of balancing
competing interests.
A. Goals of Copyright Law and the Copyright Act of 1976
The general constitutional goal of copyright laws is to “promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”156 The U.S. Constitution gives
Congress the power to promote this goal “by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”157 In other words, Congress grants to artists and
inventors a limited monopoly over their expression and in return the
public is able to benefit from access to the works and ideas contained
within them. Copyright law requires courts to balance the interests of
artists and the public in order to promote “science and the useful arts.”158
This goal was firmly established by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.159 In the Sony case, the Supreme
Court explained that “[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.”160 Thus, the ultimate goal of copyright law is to balance the
interests of the public with the interests of authors.
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976 in order to balance
these interests.161 Copyright law protects “original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed.”162 The Copyright Act protects neither ideas nor facts; only
the expression of those ideas falls under the scope of the legislation.163
Under section 106, the Copyright Act grants an author an exclusive list
of rights, including the right to make copies, to perform, and to create
derivative works.164 The Copyright Act protects these enumerated rights
against infringement.165 Plaintiffs establish copyright infringement by
156
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922 (2006); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569,
579 (1994).
157
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
158
Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness
Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 899 n.4 (1999).
159
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
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demonstrating a valid registration and the defendant’s violation of any
one of the enumerated, exclusive rights of the Copyright Act.166
Following the Copyright Act’s grant of rights, the statute provides
several exceptions to the artist’s exclusive rights, including fair use.167
This combination of granting exclusive rights to artists then subsequently
excepting them in favor of free public access is an example of how
Congress balanced the interests of artists and the public.
B. Contributory Copyright Liability, Generally
Although the Copyright Act does not explicitly mention
contributory liability, infringers risk litigation from a theory of direct or
contributory infringement.168 The Supreme Court has held that although
the express language of the Copyright Act does not establish liability for
contributory infringement, this silence does not “preclude the imposition
of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not
themselves engaged in the infringing activity.”169 Accordingly, “one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held
liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”170
C. Balance and Contributory Liability in the Copyright Context
As technology continually evolves, courts addressing copyright
issues have encountered difficulties similar to those courts applying
trademark law to new developments. Courts must still balance the
interests of consumers, competitors, and intellectual property holders
when applying standards for infringement and contributory liability to
new mediums. These difficulties and the importance of balancing
interests are exemplified in three very important copyright cases: Sony,
Napster, and MGM Studios.
1. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sony is an excellent example of
how courts interpret copyright laws, specifically contributory liability,
while balancing the interests of consumers and copyright holders. This
case dealt with Sony’s “new” Betamax video tape recorders, or VTRs,
166
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and the consumer’s ability to use Betamax VTRs to record programs to
view them at a later time.171 The Court labeled this “problem” as “timeshifting.”172 Time-shifting allows the consumer to “see programs they
otherwise would miss because they are not at home, are occupied with
other tasks, or are viewing a program on another station at the time of a
broadcast that they desire to watch.”173 The Court focused its discussion
on the consumer’s use of the VTR, holding that Sony had “no direct
involvement with any infringing activity.”174 The Court concluded that
the substantial time-shifting benefits to consumers outweighed the
concerns of the copyright holders, and denied the plaintiffs an injunction
against the Sony VTRs.175
Initially, the Court appeared willing to hold Sony liable for
contributory infringement if the plaintiffs were able to show that Sony
sold the VTRs with constructive knowledge that consumers “may use”
the VTRs to infringe upon copyrighted materials.176 However,
considering the interests of consumers, Sony itself, and many television
producers, the Supreme Court held that the mere capability for infringing
use did not make the sale of VTRs that of contributory infringement.177
The Court reasoned that if a product was “widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes,” or merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses, the chain of liability was broken.178 According to the
majority, there was “considerable testimony” given at trial about the
potential for both infringing and non-infringing uses.179 Despite this, the
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s request for an injunction based on
an argument that infringing uses outweighed non-infringing uses.180 The
Supreme Court quoted the district court, which explained that,
“[w]hatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use
recording might be, an injunction which seeks to deprive the public of
the very tool or article of commerce capable of some noninfringing use
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Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
Id. at 423.
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Id. at 447.
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Id. at 456.
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Id. at 439.
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See id. at 442.
178
Id.
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Id. at 424.
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Id. at 444 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp.
429, 468 (D. Cal. 1979) (“Universal”)).
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would be an extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented in
copyright law.”181
The Supreme Court also discussed the rights of intellectual property
holders while explaining its decision. The Court referred to the specific
context of an action for contributory liability against the seller of the
copying equipment, indicating that “the copyright holder may not prevail
unless the relief that he seeks affects only his programs, or unless he
speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the
outcome.”182 This scenario was not present in the instant case, where the
Court acknowledged that many producers of television programs would
not oppose time-shifting since it increased the size of the audience.183
The Court held that time-shifting was a non-commercial, private use, but
that copies made for commercial or profit-making purposes would be
unfair and in violation of the Copyright Act.184 The Court described
commercial uses as presumptively unfair exploitations of the “monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright” while explaining
that “noncommercial uses [however] are a different matter.”185 Returning
to its balancing task, the Court noted that “prohibition of such
noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas without any
countervailing benefit.”186
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sony demonstrates the importance
of balancing the interests of consumers, competitors, and intellectual
property holders in the context of contributory liability. In that case, the
Court found that the interests of consumers and some television
producers outweighed the interests of the plaintiffs.187 VTRs afforded
consumers the ability to “time-shift,” which the Court considered as a
benefit to both consumers and producers.188 Consequently, the Court held
time-shifting as a substantial non-infringing use that severed the chain of
liability.189 The Court did not ignore the plaintiff’s claims of
infringement; it acknowledged this issue by indicating that noncommercial uses are presumptively unfair in violation of the copyright
statue.190 After balancing the interests of all sides, the Supreme Court
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185
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Id. (quoting Universal, 480 F. Supp. at 468) (emphasis added).
Id. at 446.
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Id. at 449.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 450–51.
See id. at 456.
Id. at 430.
See id. at 456.
Id. at 449.
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denied the plaintiff’s request for an injunction against Sony’s sale of the
VTRs.191
2. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. is another example of how courts
balance the interests of consumers and intellectual property holders in the
context of contributory infringement. Decided after Sony, the Ninth
Circuit in this case found Napster liable for contributory infringement.192
Napster offered users free software that facilitated “peer-to-peer” file
sharing.193 Among other things, the software allowed users to: “(1) make
MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives available for
copying by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on
other users’ computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of
other users’ MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet.”194
The court found that Napster, by its conduct, knowingly encouraged and
assisted in the infringement of A&M’s copyrights and was therefore
liable for contributory infringement.195
According to the Ninth Circuit, ordinarily the defendant must make
a material contribution and “know or have reason to know” of the direct
infringement to be held liable for contributory infringement.196 Napster’s
material contribution was simple—providing the “site and facilities” for
the direct infringers.197 However, according to the Ninth Circuit, in the
Internet context, courts should construe the knowledge requirement
much more narrowly.198 The opinion indicated that a court may not
impute the knowledge required to find contributory liability “merely
because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe
plaintiffs’ copyrights.”199 The Ninth Circuit explained that Napster was
required to prove that it did not have actual knowledge of the
infringement.200 According to the court, “the copyright holder must
‘provide the necessary documentation [to Napster] to show there is likely
infringement.’”201 However, once Napster learned that users were able to
191

Id. at 456.
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Id. at 1011. MP3s are digital audio recordings. Id.
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Id. at 1020.
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Id. at 1020, 1022.
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Id. at 1022.
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Id. at 1020.
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Id. at 1020–21.
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Id. at 1021.
201
Id. (quoting Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
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access specific infringing materials, Napster had a duty to purge the
infringing materials from the system.202 Failure to do so, according to the
court, was evidence that Napster actually knew of the infringement and
contributed to the direct infringement.203 In other words, the Ninth
Circuit requires that the system operator, in this case Napster, possess
specific information pertaining to copyright infringement and not mere
knowledge of the potential for the software to facilitate infringement.204
The court concluded that Napster did, in fact, have sufficient knowledge
of the infringing activities to be liable for contributory infringement.205
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit balanced the right of consumers to
use file sharing technology with the rights of intellectual property
holders. The court refused to enjoin all peer-to-peer file sharing “simply
because a computer network allows for infringing use.”206 Such a
decision, according to the court, would “violate Sony and potentially
restrict activity unrelated to infringing use.”207 The Ninth Circuit then
remanded the case back to the district court to determine the details of
the injunction against Napster.208 Napster was later enjoined “from
engaging in, or facilitating others in, copying, downloading, uploading,
transmitting, or distributing copyrighted sound recordings,” in
accordance with the district court’s order.209 This order did not prevent
Napster from allowing consumers to use its software for non-infringing
uses.210
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit found Napster liable for infringement
while at the same time balancing the interests of consumers and
intellectual property holders. The Ninth Circuit required more than
constructive knowledge of the software’s potential for infringing uses.211
The plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that Napster had made a material
contribution to the infringing activities of its users and that the company
had sufficient knowledge of the infringement.212 As a result, the court
enjoined Napster from facilitating the distribution of copyrighted
materials.213 However, after balancing the interests of consumers and
202
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A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
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intellectual property holders, the court also held that the law should not
restrict all peer-to-peer file sharing.214 Thus, the court concluded that,
although it was necessary to protect the intellectual property holders, it
was also important for consumers to be able to use the file sharing
technology.215
3. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. is the third example of a court
balancing the interests of consumers and intellectual property holders in
the context of contributory copyright infringement.216 In MGM Studios,
the Supreme Court added another element to the contributory liability
equation—intent to induce.217 The MGM Studios case involved peer-topeer file sharing that was similar to the Napster software. 218 The
defendants, Grokster and Streamcast, distributed free software that
enabled users to download copyrighted and non-copyrighted materials
directly from other users.219 In reversing the Ninth’s Circuit’s grant of
summary judgment to the defendants, the Supreme Court explained that
a party which promotes its product and encourages copyright
infringement, “as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement,” will be liable for contributory
infringement.220
The Court denied the defendants summary judgment because the
plaintiffs had successfully alleged a material contribution, knowledge of
the infringement, and intent to induce the users to infringe.221 The Court
tied all of these factors together to create an “inducement rule.”222 After
balancing the potential effects of the rule, the Court noted that its
“inducement rule” would do “nothing to compromise legitimate
commerce or discourage innovation.”223 Under the “inducement rule,”
the Court required a showing of “purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct,” which it found in the instant case.224 The defendants had
developed promotional materials that touted their products as the best
214

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020–21.
See id.
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MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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See id. at 913.
218
Id. at 919–20.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 919.
221
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222
Id. at 936–37.
223
Id. at 937.
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alternative to Napster.225 There was also evidence that Streamcast had
planned to promote illegal uses of its product.226 The Court found no
evidence that the defendants had made even the slightest effort to “filter
copyrighted material from users’ downloads or otherwise impede the
sharing of copyrighted files.”227 That behavior convinced the Court of the
defendants’ intent to induce consumers to infringe, and was a sufficient
basis to deny the defendant summary judgment.228
The defendants argued that, in light of Sony, the software’s ability
to sustain non-infringing uses severed the chain of liability.229 Yet the
Court was unwilling to apply the Sony rule because of the egregious
conduct by the defendants.230 To the Court, “a showing that infringement
was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a
defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful
use.”231 In other words, evidence of intent to induce infringement by a
third party may be so powerful that it is able to overcome the rule
developed in Sony.
The Supreme Court did not decide MGM Studios without balancing
the effects of its holding. The plaintiffs argued that finding in favor of the
defendants would upset the “balance between the respective values of
supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting
innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence
of liability for copyright infringement.”232 Citing to Sony, the majority
acknowledged that the “more artistic protection is favored, the more
technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of
copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off.”233 The Court
concluded that finding in favor of the plaintiffs and reversing summary
judgment for the defendants was in the best interests of both consumers
as well as intellectual property holders.

225

Id. at 925. The Court mentioned some proposed advertisements. One read:
“Napster Inc. has announced that it will soon begin charging you a fee. That’s if the
courts don’t order it shut down first. What will you do to get around it?” Another
proposed advertisement touted Streamcast’s software as the “#1 alternative to Napster”
and asked “[w]hen the lights went off at Napster . . . where did the users go?” Id.
(citations omitted).
226
Id.
227
Id. at 926–27.
228
Id. at 941.
229
Id. at 933.
230
See id. at 939–41.
231
Id. at 936.
232
Id. at 928.
233
Id.

252

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:223

In MGM Studios, the Supreme Court utilized the “inducement rule”
and denied the defendant summary judgment.234 The plaintiffs were able
to show a material contribution, knowledge of the infringement, and a
total lack of any action on the defendants’ part to curb infringing
downloads.235 The defendants were not able to succeed using Sony’s
substantial non-infringing uses defense because of the their clear intent to
induce users to download infringing materials.236 Therefore, the Court
denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the
case to consider the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.237
The three aforementioned copyright cases each demonstrate how
courts balance the interests of competing parties when applying the
doctrine of contributory liability in the copyright context. In Sony, the
consumer’s interest in maintaining the ability to time-shift outweighed
the imposition of contributory infringement liability on the producers of
the infringing equipment.238 To satisfy the balance, the Supreme Court
applied the rule that the manufacturers of equipment used to infringe
could escape liability if the products were capable of substantial noninfringing uses.239 In Napster, the Ninth Circuit found that parties who
provide a material contribution may be liable for the infringement if
there was actual knowledge of infringing activities by third parties using
the products.240 Finally, in MGM Studios, the Supreme Court held that a
showing of intent to encourage infringing activities is sufficient to rebut
Sony’s substantial non-infringing uses defense.241 In sum, both the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit utilized “contributory liability” to
satisfy the balance between the interests of consumers and intellectual
property holders.
V. BALANCING CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY AND INITIAL INTEREST
CONFUSION
Part V of this comment discusses initial interest confusion and
contributory trademark liability in the Internet context. First, this section
describes the balancing goal of copyright law analogous to trademark
law. Next, the section discusses how courts should treat initial interest
confusion in the Internet context with respect to balancing the interests of
consumers and intellectual property holders. Finally, this section
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

Id. at 941.
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Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
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A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
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examines the effect of a new standard for initial interest confusion on the
application of contributory liability in the Internet context.
A. The Analogous Balance
Admittedly, the laws of trademark and copyright protection are
significantly different.242 Trademark laws are founded on principles that
seek to avoid deception and unfair competition,243 while copyright laws
derive from the wording of the U.S. Constitution.244 Despite this
difference, the underlying goals of both trademark and copyright laws
share many similarities. In these areas of intellectual property law, courts
have recognized the importance of balancing consumer interests with the
interests of the intellectual property holders.245 As the three copyright
cases discussed prior have shown, Sony, Napster, and MGM Studios,
judges are concerned with balancing competing interests, generally
reasoning to promote this balance.
B. Initial Interest Confusion in Light of this Balance
The underlying goal of trademark law is to balance the interests of
consumers and intellectual property holders. The circuit split created by
the Second and Ninth Circuits complicates the balancing task for district
courts. As a result, this comment suggests a new approach that
incorporates a broader understanding of “use in commerce” into a
narrower concept of “confusion” in the Internet context.
1. “Use in Commerce”
The “use in commerce” inquiry is very important in trademark
cases. Without establishing “use,” plaintiffs are unable to invoke
protection under the Lanham Act.246 Given rapid changes in technology
and coding on the Internet, one can easily observe that the Second
Circuit’s decision was too narrow. By restricting the “use in commerce”
requirement, the Second Circuit ignored the fact that technology is everchanging and that more likely than not, in the near future there will be
new, more subtle ways in which defendants will be attempt to use and
abuse trademarks on the Internet. The Second Circuit failed to balance
the effects of its decision between consumers and intellectual property
242
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (discussing how the kinship between patents and copyrights
does not exist between copyrights and trademarks).
243
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1:1.
244
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
245
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Sony, 464
U.S. at 456.
246
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 6:2.
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holders. This discrepancy favors a strong argument that, in the Internet
context, “use” of trademarks in Google’s AdWords program is, in fact,
“use in commerce,” regardless of how deeply the defendants buried the
trademark in coding, or whether or not the consumer was able to see the
plaintiff’s trademarks on the computer screen.
2. Likelihood of Confusion
Once the plaintiff has been able to invoke the protection of the
Lanham Act, the plaintiff must still establish a likelihood of confusion—
“the most difficult of the Lanham Act requirements to prove.”247 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that many of the Sleekcraft factors did not
apply in the Internet context.248 In reality, many of the factors are not
applicable to the Internet context and do not answer whether or not the
ordinary prudent consumer would be confused.249
At one time, courts considered the sophistication of the average
Internet user to be very low. According to the District Court for the
District of New Jersey, in 1998 “many Internet users [were] not
sophisticated enough to distinguish between the subtle difference in the
domain names of the parties.”250 At that time, the Internet was relatively
new to many computer users, and only available to a limited number of
consumers. Today, a decade after the initial statement was made, the
outmoded standard mandates an updated review of consumer interests as
well as the interests of intellectual property holders. After all, the
widespread use of computers and the Internet is what prompted the prior
development in the law through cases such as 1-800 Contacts, Playboy,
Napster, and MGM Studios.
The question then becomes, who is the new “ordinary prudent
Internet consumer”? The Second Circuit described average consumers as
“the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making
purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and
general impressions.”251 That average consumer has already been placed
into the Internet context, and according to the District Court for the
District of New Jersey, he is not too reasonable.252 In GEICO and
247

Lauren Troxclair, Note, Search Engines and Internet Advertisers: Just One Click
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(9th Cir. 1999).
250
Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 303 (D.N.J. 1998).
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Playboy, the court’s “confusion” analysis relied on the interpretation of
consumer surveys produced by both sides.253 But in GEICO, the
plaintiffs were able to sustain a cause of action for confusion only for
those advertisements that displayed the plaintiffs’ trademarks to
consumers.254 Thus, according to the GEICO court, the ordinary prudent
Internet consumer was only “confused” in the Lanham sense when the
consumer entered the plaintiff’s trademark into an Internet search engine
and the competing advertisements on the results page actually displayed
the plaintiff’s trademarks.
A new standard would arm courts with an improved ability to
answer many of the questions presented by the “Average Joe” scenario.
In such circumstances, the defendant would have clearly “used the good
will associated with the Plaintiffs’ trademarks in such a way that [the
ordinary prudent Internet consumer] might be lured to the [products]
from Plaintiffs’ competitors” to violate the Lanham Act.255 This is
essentially the “bait and switch” tactic that the Seventh Circuit discussed
in Dorr-Oliver.256 Presenting advertisements which utilize the trademarks
of a competitor “effectively [allows] the competitor to get its foot in the
door by confusing consumers” as to the source of the advertisements.257
The consumer searches for the trademark, and an advertisement appears.
The consumer clicks on the advertisement and finds himself on a
competing website. Google itself recognized the unauthorized use of
trademarks in advertisements as a problem and it created a complaint
system for trademark holders in response.258 A more rigid standard for
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Google, Inc., AdWords Trademark Complaint Procedure,
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initial interest confusion in the Internet context clarifies many of the
questions presented by the “Average Joe” scenario.
3. The New “Ordinary Prudent Internet Consumer” and Balance
Restricting the confusion analysis to the “ordinary prudent Internet
consumer” would satisfy the balance of interests between consumers,
competitors, and intellectual property holders. Although arguably
annoying, pop-ups and other advertisements can benefit the consumer.259
First, search engine advertisements inform consumers about other
companies on the Internet that offer the same or similar products.
Second, advertisements expose the consumer to multiple sources of
similar products. Third, the consumer is quickly able to compare prices
on products in various physical locations. Finally, consumers can easily
“click” back to the original website or product they were originally
searching for: “[t]he risk of losing customers who are initially confused
is lessened on the Internet as compared, for example, to when a billboard
employs initial interest confusion to entice a customer down the wrong
road because a customer can retrace his steps almost instantaneously
online.”260 It is important to recognize that advertisements, when not
confusing, do offer some benefit to consumers; thus, courts consider this
when balancing the effects of precedential decisions.
The “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard would also
enhance competition by creating a clear standard which does not saddle
competitors with unfair liability. In general, “competitors have an
affirmative right to use others’ trademarks to capture public attention and
attempt to divert it to their own products.”261 As explained in the GEICO
case, if the defendants had properly labeled their advertisements with the
defendants’ trademarks, it would likely not result in consumer
confusion.262 In such a situation, the defendant could argue that the use of
the plaintiff’s trademark was a fair use.263 However, if defendants have
used the plaintiff’s trademarks in their advertisements in such a way as to

259
Google, Inc., Are pop-up ads allowed on Google?,
http://www.google.com/corporate/nopopupads.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007) (“[Google]
does not allow pop-up ads of any kind on [Google’s] site [because Google] find[s] them
annoying.”).
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GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18642, at *15 (D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
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create confusion, the “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard
would hold defendants liable for initial interest confusion.
Additionally, adopting a high standard for initial interest confusion
may also benefit the trademark holder. First, free search engines are not
available only to the consumer. Trademark holders may also take
advantage of search engines as an opportunity to find out who the
competition is and what the competition is doing. Second, the fact that
consumers are able to shop competitively does not damage the trademark
holder’s goodwill. There must be some type of association between the
trademark holder and the competing product before a court will
recognize any damage to the goodwill of the trademark holder.264
Problems arise only “when the goodwill and reputation of a plaintiff’s
trademark is linked to products which are of shoddy quality or which
conjure associations that clash with the associations generated by the
owner’s lawful use of the mark . . . .”265 If there is no likelihood of
confusion, there can be no tarnishment. Third, there is cognizable danger
when courts are allowed to create norms that “prohibit search engines
from ‘using’ trademarks in any way that might bring financial benefit to
the trademark holder’s competitor” because then the courts will have
disserved the information objectives of the Lanham Act by turning
trademarks into vehicles for suppressing information.”266 Finally, a
specific inquiry for initial interest confusion would eliminate the need for
expensive survey data that is uncertain at best. Presumably, if the
standards and the laws are clear and simple, there will be less
litigation.267 The outcome of initial interest confusion litigation in the
Internet context would become more predictable and the parties “would
be more willing to settle.”268 Accordingly, this new standard would prove
beneficial to trademark holders.
The underlying goal of trademark law is to balance the interests of
consumers, competitors, and intellectual property holders. This balance
translates into every aspect of the application of trademark law including
the “use in commerce” and “initial interest confusion” inquiries. A court
should not minimize the “use in commerce” inquiry; neither should a
court restrict applications of law due to technological loopholes. The
District Court for the District of Virginia’s holding that Internet
264
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advertisements would not create confusion unless the defendants actually
used the trademark in the competing advertisement is a clear standard for
the “new” ordinary prudent Internet consumer. Such a standard for the
“ordinary prudent Internet consumer” answers many of the questions
discussed in the “Average Joe” scenario to satisfy the balance between
the interests of the consumer, competitors, and trademark holders.
C. Contributory Liability in Light of this Balance
As explained in this comment, courts favor balancing interests in
both copyright and trademark cases. The new “ordinary prudent Internet
consumer” standard for initial interest confusion is the result of this
balancing task. However, the consequences of implementing a new
confusion standard do not end with direct infringers. The new standard
would also affect claims of contributory liability. One should consider
the effects on contributory liability in light of the similarities and
differences between trademark and copyright laws as well as the balance
between the interests of Internet search engines and intellectual property
holders.
1. Contributory Trademark Liability versus Contributory Copyright
Liability in the Internet Context
The standards of contributory liability for trademark and copyright
law share significant similarities and differences. In Inwood Labs, the
Supreme Court outlined two tests for contributory liability: (1) one who
“intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark,” and (2)
“continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to
know is engaging in trademark infringement,” can be held liable for
contributory infringement.269 The elements involved (knowledge, intent,
and a material contribution) are identical between the trademark and the
copyright standards. However, in the Internet context, there are very
important differences. First, the test applied in Napster was much stricter
than the Inwood Labs test because the Ninth Circuit required actual
knowledge rather than constructive knowledge: “knows or has reason to
know.”270 Second, if trademark holders were unable to prove knowledge
and a material contribution, Inwood Labs introduced a second test by
asking whether the defendants intentionally induce the infringement.271
While the copyright test for contributory liability required knowledge,
plaintiffs only need to show intent to rebut a Sony “substantial non269
270
271
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infringing uses” defense. Thus, while the elements of contributory
liability are similar, the application of those elements differs between
copyrights and trademarks.
There is another important variation between the application of
contributory infringement for copyrights and for trademarks. In Hard
Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit explained that, in Sony, “[t]he Supreme Court tells us that
secondary liability for trademark infringement should . . . be more
narrowly drawn than secondary liability for copyright infringement.”272
In Sony, the Supreme Court recognized that the test set forth in Inwood
Labs for trademarks was much stricter than that for copyrights because
that test requires that the defendants either “intentionally induced” the
infringers to infringe or “supply its products to identified individuals
known by it to be engaging in continuing infringement . . . .”273 Neither
of these elements were present in Sony.274 In addition, neither the
Seventh Circuit case nor Sony actually involved the Internet. Therefore, a
logical conclusion draws the standard for contributory trademark liability
in the Internet context more narrowly than the standard for contributory
copyright liability in the Internet context.
2. Contributory Trademark Liability for Initial Interest Confusion in
the Internet Context
The new “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard for
confusion would also affect the application of contributory liability for
initial interest confusion in the Internet context. If initial interest
confusion in the Internet context requires that the infringing
advertisement display the plaintiff’s trademark, the application of the
knowledge and intent tests must change. There are two important effects
as a result. First, the changes to the requisite knowledge and intent
requirements would satisfy the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Hard
Rock—the test for contributory trademark liability in the Internet context
would be more narrowly drawn that the test for copyright
infringement.275 Second, the variation would operate to narrow the field
of contributory infringers yet still balance the interests of Internet search
engines, consumers, and intellectual property holders.
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a) The Knowledge Test
If the “new ordinary prudent Internet consumer” is confused only
when the defendant actually displays the mark in the competing
advertisement, the degree of knowledge required to establish
contributory liability under the knowledge test changes in response. A
plaintiff would now have to establish that the reasonable Internet search
engine had reason to know that “it was actively participating in an
operation which constituted . . . trademark infringement,” or that the
advertisements the Internet service provider supported were infringing.276
Therefore, the plaintiff would need to show that the Internet search
engine knew or had reason to know that the advertisements actually
displayed the plaintiff’s trademarks. This is a much narrower
requirement than the copyright standard currently endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Sony and MGM Studios.277 In those cases, the Court
only required knowledge of specific instances of infringement, not
specific knowledge of the content that was infringed.278 In contrast,
requiring specific knowledge of the content of the advertisements is no
different from the law’s treatment of ordinary brick-and-mortar
commerce.279 A sign that uses another’s trademark to confuse consumers
does not incur different legal consequences apart from a computer
advertisement intending the same result.280 Courts adopting this standard
would not need to carve exceptions or twist rigid legal standards to
conform to ever-changing computing and advertising technologies. Thus,
while the basic Internet standard would remain unchanged, the
knowledge test would draw more narrowly in the trademark context than
in the copyright context.
Under a new standard, plaintiffs would face the challenge of
establishing that an Internet search engine “knew or had reason to know”
that the direct infringer’s advertisements used the plaintiff’s
trademarks.281 However, in Google’s case, it may even be possible for
plaintiffs to establish actual knowledge of specific instances of direct
infringement akin to the Ninth Circuit’s requirement in Napster.282 For
example, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that Google had
276
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knowledge of a direct infringer using the plaintiff’s trademark on the
advertisements that Google facilitated. A court may find that Google had
reason to know of the contents of the advertisements, because parties are
generally responsible for trademark infringement on their own
websites.283 Furthermore, under Google’s advertising program, Google
reviews the contents of advertisements “using a combination of human
and automated processes.”284 Google also helps clients determine the
content of the advertisements that Google supports.285 Under such
circumstances, Google could be liable for actual knowledge of infringing
content in advertisements. However, determining liability through the
knowledge inquiry would remain a very fact-sensitive inquiry.
b) The Inducement Test
The “new ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard would also
affect the level of intent required to establish contributory liability under
the inducement test. Plaintiffs would be required to show that the Internet
search engine encouraged the unauthorized use of trademarks in
competing advertisements. The imposition of such a requirement would
surely satisfy the MGM Studios standard for intent, since plaintiffs would
essentially be demonstrating “clear expression or other affirmative steps .
. . to foster infringement.”286 Yet nothing in the Google AdWords cases
demonstrates egregious behavior comparable to that by the defendants in
MGM Studios. Merely encouraging someone to advertise with Google
would not be enough evidence to establish that Google encouraged its
sponsors to use another’s trademarks without consent. However, courts
could consider the “content assistance” which Google provides to its
advertising clients,287 to be “purposeful, culpable expression and
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conduct.”288 Again, determining intent to induce infringement would
remain a very fact-sensitive inquiry.
c) Balancing the Interests of Internet Search Engines and
Intellectual Property Holders
Requiring a heightened, but specific requirement of knowledge and
intent would properly balance the interests of Internet search engines,
consumers, and intellectual property holders. Internet search engines
would still be able to profit from advertising sales without fear of
liability because they would have a clear guideline to follow: do not
support advertisers who use competitor’s trademarks as their own.
Internet search engines would not necessarily bear a burden of changing
any current advertising scheme or coding techniques; rather, they need
only alter the content of the advertisements that the search engines
support. Consumers would still be able to enter a trademark as a search
term and benefit from the list of multiple sources and prices of similar
goods. The standard would work to lessen consumers’ confusion while
still promoting variety, knowledge, and choice. Although intellectual
property holders may be discouraged because of the specificity required
to establish contributory liability, establishing the requisite knowledge
for contributory liability may not be impossible. Intellectual property
holders would still be capable of curbing wide-spread infringement by
suing Internet search engines. However, the need for lawsuits would
decline if Internet search engines worked with advertisers to reduce the
instances of infringement, as Google has done.289 By utilizing the new
“ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard, courts would be able to
balance the interests of Internet search engines and intellectual property
holders.
The new “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard for initial
interest confusion would generate two important effects on the
application of contributory trademark liability. First, both the knowledge
and intent legal tests would be more narrowly drawn and stricter in
application than contributory copyright liability, as required by the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of a Supreme Court decision. Second,
these changes to the direct application of the elements of contributory
trademark liability would effectively balance the interests of Internet
search engines, consumers, and intellectual property holders. Thus, the
consequence of a new standard for initial interest confusion in the
Internet context respects the differences between copyright and
288
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trademark law and promotes the importance of balancing the interests of
all parties affected by these decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to address the problems presented by
the “Average Joe” scenario. However, this comment suggests that by
looking to the common goal of trademark and copyright law and
addressing the way courts have applied the law to further this goal, many
questions raised by the “Average Joe” scenario may answer themselves.
Though copyright protection under the Copyright Act and trademark
protection under the Lanham Act are not equivalent, both share a primary
goal of balancing interests. When applying these laws, courts must
balance the interests of the consumers, competitors, and intellectual
property holders. The new “ordinary prudent Internet consumer”
standard would alter the application of both initial interest confusion and
contributory liability doctrine, yet the result would still balance the
interests of the parties affected by the decision. Whatever future fate the
Supreme Court or Congress dictates for initial interest confusion and
contributory liability in the Internet context, the result should balance the
interests of consumers, competitors, contributors and intellectual
property holders.

